Letter of the Month, June 2017

Letter of the Month, June 2017

June’s letter of the month concerns various connections between modal logic and ordinary language. Does modal logic have its own source of intuitions? Is modal logic or ‘modal language’ as philosophers conceive of it a thing of its own? What is it exactly? In this...

Letter of the month, May 2017

Soon after the publication of David Lewis’s On the Plurality of Worlds it received reviews in many journals by leading philosophers. In this letter Lewis replies to Philip P. Hanson’s 1986 review from Philosophy in Review, vol. 6, pp. 498-500. Lewis reacts...

Letter of the month, April 2017

April’s letter of the month, to Theodore Ziolkowski in May 1983, sees Lewis apparently comparing philosophy unfavourably with science. His starting point is an article in the Syracuse Scholar, ‘Pseudoscience’, by C.L. Hardin. (You can read the article here:...
Letter of the month, March 2017

Letter of the month, March 2017

David Lewis famously proposed that counterpart theory can substitute quantified modal logic. He argued that instead of formalising modal discourse using modal operators we can stick with first-order predicate logic with identity so long as we introduce talk of...

Letter of the Month, February 2017

This letter to Davidson was written as Lewis was making significant strides away from the influence of Quine and beginning to wonder whether there really might be systematic and deep indeterminacy of thought and language, as Quine had claimed. By the time of “Radical...

Letter of the Month, January 2017

David Lewis is notoriously known for believing in the existence of concrete possible worlds equally real as our own. It came to be known as (genuine) modal realism. His systematic presentation and defence of the view appeared in On the Plurality of Worlds (Blackwell,...